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The Norwegian Helsinki Committee
Established in 1977
The Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC) is a non-governmental organisation that works to promote 
respect for human rights, nationally and internationally. Its work is based on the conviction that 
documentation and active promotion of human rights by civil society is needed for states to secure 
human rights, at home and in other countries.
 
NHC bases its work on international human rights instruments adopted by the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act.
 
The main areas of focus for the NHC are the countries of Europe, North America and Central Asia. The 
NHC works irrespective of ideology or political system in these countries and maintains political 
neutrality.
How we work
Human rights monitoring and reporting
Through monitoring and reporting on problematic human rights situations in specific countries, the 
NHC sheds light on violations of human rights. The NHC places particular emphasis on civil and 
political rights, including the fundamental freedoms of expression, belief, association and assembly. 
On-site research and close co-operation with key civil society actors are our main working methods. 
The NHC has expertise in election observation and has sent numerous observer missions to elections 
over the last two decades.
Support for democratic processes 
By sharing knowledge and with financial assistance, the NHC supports local initiatives for the promotion 
of an independent civil society and public institutions as well as a free media. A civil society that 
functions well is a precondition for the development of democracy.
Education and information 
Through education and information about democracy and human rights, international law and 
multicultural understanding, we work to increase the focus on human rights violations. Our aim is to 
influence both public opinion and governments in human rights matters. 
International processes 
As with our educational work, the NHC seeks to influence governments and international organisations 
through participation in international processes, meetings and conferences to make human rights a 
priority.
About Freedom House
Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom 
around the world.
Today, as more than two billion people live under oppressive rule, Freedom House speaks out against 
the main threats to democracy and empowers citizens to exercise their fundamental rights.  We analyze 
the challenges to freedom; advocate for greater political and civil liberties; and support frontline 
activists to defend human rights and promote democratic change.  Founded in 1941, Freedom House 
was the first American organization to champion the advancement of freedom globally.
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INTRODUCTION
Kazakhstan has travelled a long and sometimes difficult road in the years since 
independence in 1991. From being largely isolated from the world outside the Soviet 
Union, globalization has taken hold at an increasingly fast pace. Today, numerous 
international flights bring in still larger numbers of visitors – be they businessmen, tourists 
or locals returning from studies or work abroad. The internet age is slowly reaching even 
the most outlying parts of the country, bringing with it new impulses and perspectives 
to a young population that grew up after the Soviet era.
While the ongoing integration of Central Asia into the global scene involves rapid change 
on many levels, certain areas are still left behind. It is not unusual for the population 
to be without electricity and gas during severe winter frosts. Bureaucracy too, retains 
much of its post-Soviet legacy, as do the attitudes of some government officials and 
key decision-makers. National economic indicators are not always consistent with the 
reality of those struggling to get by in the cities and villages dotting Central Asia’s vast 
landscape. 
As the economic leader of the Central Asian region and the country most strongly tuned 
in to the global diplomatic and business communities, Kazakhstan carries a particular 
responsibility to respect, and indeed to promote, human rights and democratic principles. 
However, while working along an ambitious program for planned future achievements 
both on the domestic and international arena, Kazakhstan has seen several major steps 
backwards in the area of human rights over the past two years. 
Following the tragic events in Zhanaozen in December 2011, when at least 16 strikers 
were shot and killed by government forces, authorities cracked down on selected 
opposition leaders such as Vladimir Kozlov of the Alga political party, sentencing him 
to seven-and-a-half years’ imprisonment for his alleged involvement in the strikes. 
Soon after, the offices of Alga were closed down by authorities, followed by charges 
of extremism against independent and opposition media outlets, many of which were 
closed down by court order.
As a result, Kazakhstan is currently economically strong, but suffering a bleak media 
scene, a lack of real political pluralism and a widespread disillusionment as to Kazakhstan’s 
commitment to human rights.
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The following report summarizes some of our current concerns with regards to freedom 
of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion or belief. It also brings the 
perspective of one of Kazakhstan’s most respected writers on current affairs, Sergey 
Duvanov, in a special article for the 2013 Human Dimensions Implementation Meeting 
in Warszaw. Other texts were prepared by Ivar Dale (NHC) and Viktoria Tyuleneva (FH).
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CUNNING DEMOCRACY
Officially, the government of Kazakhstan does not recognize its own style of government 
as authoritarian. Government officials, as well as pro-government political commentators 
and analysts, categorically exclude the term when describing the current form of 
governance. Rather, they point to the presence in the country of formal institutions of 
democracy, and the declaration of certain principles, when attempting to prove the 
democratic nature of the Kazakhstani state, referring to Kazakhstan as a transitional 
democracy. By transitional democracy is meant a form of government that places 
temporary limitations on the rights and freedoms of citizens – an issue which is gradually 
overcome through the government’s own efforts. 
The general message of officials and pro-government commentators is that the establishment 
of democracy in Kazakhstan is a long-winded process fraught with serious problems, 
but that the authorities are continuously and successfully solving these problems. On 
the one hand, the argument is intended to explain the imperfections of legislation in 
the country, the formality of its democratic institutions, the limitations on the rights and 
freedoms of citizens and even the problems of the opposition and dissidents. On the 
other hand, it is intended to demonstrate to all that autocracy is the only way towards 
democracy. 
Kazakhstan does not merely follow and repeat the experience of democratic countries. 
From the very beginning of the country’s independence, the authorities have sought to 
please everyone though their foreign policies, in exchange for support and recognition. 
Later, this has taken the shape of a multi-vector foreign policy.
Establishing a democratic image of Kazakhstan in the eyes of Europe and the US was 
a pre-requisite to gain support for president Nazarbayev’s many ambitious projects. 
Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE, including the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana, 
its hosting the meetings of the Congress of World Religions, Asian Winter Games, 
EXPO-2017, applications to host the Olympic Games, regular attempts to nominate 
Nazarbayev for the Nobel Peace Prize and many other initiatives were and continue to 
be one of the strategic tasks of the Kazakhstani government in realizing the ambitions 
of its leader, President Nazarbayev.
Obviously, without certain steps taken towards democracy and without the establishment 
of its formal institutions, ambitious projects designed to magnify the importance of 
President Nazarbayev would have been far more difficult to realize. However, the 
model of democracy being developed in Kazakhstan can perhaps be coined a “cunning 
democracy”, based on the existence of a few democratic institutions which have been 
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Constitution of Kazakhstan states that freedom of speech and creative activities 
shall be allowed, and that censorship is prohibited1. 
In reality, voices openly critical of government policy are suppressed in Kazakhstan and 
censorship is widely practiced. The government consistently harasses or shuts down 
independent media outlets. Libel is a criminal offense, and the criminal code prohibits 
insulting the president; self-censorship is common.
Until quite recently, many newspaper kiosks in large cities like Almaty would offer a 
selection of papers including interviews with opposition figures and representatives 
of civil society. Some of these papers were highly critical of the situation with regards 
to human rights and political freedoms in Kazakhstan. While Kazakhstani authorities 
have always placed some amount of pressure on independent media, often confiscating 
newspapers that bring articles that particularly angered the authorities, things took a 
sharp turn for the worse in 2012, in the time following the tragedy in Zhanaozen.
Among the most professional newspapers critical of the government in Kazakhstan 
were Golos Respubliki (Voice of the Republic) and Vzglyad (View). In December 2012 
the court banned all versions of these papers and numerous websites that published 
their content, as well as the Stan TV news website, and the satellite television station 
K+. In the time since, editors have been creative in trying to keep publishing their 
papers under different names. Respublika re-appeared several times for short periods 
1 Article 20, Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted August 30, 1995. 
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under easily recognizable names2, but police quickly put an end to such attempts to 
circumvent censorship. 
In effect, the reading and watching public of Kazakhstan currently has no easy access to 
independent news outlets covering Kazakhstani politics, but must rely on government-
controlled media or media that avoids political content altogether. For the time being, 
social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter are important alternative outlets, but 
generally reach only certain groups who seek out this type of information. In addition, 
Kazakhstani authorities frequently block popular web sites containing critical materials. 
One well-known journalist, Guljan Yergalieva, has had her sites blocked continuously 
without any form of explanation. Sites are generally blocked without court order, but 
rather through the state-controlled internet provider Kazakhtelekom. 
The government of Kazakhstan should put an end to censorship of critically-minded 
news outlets and harassment of independent journalists. It should ensure the respect for 
freedom of speech, as established by the Constitution of Kazakhstan and international 
standards.
2 “Voice of Respublika” (Golos Respubliki), “Voice of Respublika – kaleidoscope of week events” (Golos Respubliki 
– kaleidoskop sobitiy nedeli), “Respublika. Business kaleidoscope -the second shot” (Respublika. Delovoe obozrenie – 
dubl’ dva) and several others.
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stripped of their democratic nature. As such, they have lost their original function, 
turning into formal instruments of autocracy.
One should warn against a simplistic understanding of what we mean by “cunning 
democracy”. The cunning here lies not only in the government’s claim that the country 
is moving towards democracy, while at the same denying its citizens democratic 
rights. It is also found in the contradictory measures the government takes to promote 
democracy. This deserves a closer look.
It is undeniable that the government of Kazakhstan initiates certain democratic processes, 
establishes democratic political institutions and brings legislation into accordance with 
international standards and so forth. However, within all these processes there is a 
certain point past which the authorities will not cross under any circumstances. In their 
understanding, a real division of power would doom the current political system to 
principled change, something that is not in the interest of government representatives 
and is seen as a threat to their own position.
In everyday life, this is evident through the political control of all democratic institutions. 
This form of control eliminates the risk of political parties, civil society or popular 
initiatives having any real impact on the political situation in the country. This is the 
core of what we call Kazakh-style “cunning democracy”.
The greatest cunning of all is the country’s Constitution. Or, perhaps more to the point, in 
the way its norms are realized in practice. Formally based on the Constitution of France, 
the main legal document of Kazakhstan establishes all basic democratic principles of 
the state and its institutions: The principle of division of power, free elections, political 
pluralism, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms; its parliament, courts and media.
However, the question of whether a state is democratic or not is decided not formally, 
through normative rights, but in practice – through its social, moral, economic realities 
and especially its political realities. In Kazakhstan’s case, the difference between what 
has been established in the Constitution and how these rights are realized in everyday 
life is in itself proof of the authoritarian cunning at play.
For instance, the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the right to unhindered 
access to information. However, it is impossible to start a TV channel if public officials 
are of the opinion that the owner of the channel is not loyal to the political regime. Not 
one single Kazakhstani TV-channel will permit criticism of the current president of the 
country. The phrase “Nazarbayev should go” has never been heard on television. With 
a few minor exceptions, the same goes for printed media. A textbook example is the 
case of the opposition journalist Ermurat Bapi, who has tried seven times to register a 
newspaper, who has been rejected every time for different reasons, and who still has 
not been able to register.
8  (REPORT  4•2013)
A few oppositional papers with small circulation are the exceptions. These papers 
have been able to find judicial loopholes and avoid official obstacles. Some managed 
to circumvent the registration process, some bought their license from owners of old 
papers. However, the activities of these newspapers are associated with a continuous 
risk of being held administratively, legally and criminally responsible, something that 
limits their ability to grow and for readers to purchase their paper. At the same time, 
the fact that they do exist gives the authorities a chance to speak of “alternative views 
in the media”, and hence to declare that freedom of speech exists in Kazakhstan. The 
cunning lies in the fact that this form of freedom of speech is so limited that the majority 
of the population has no access to alternative information, while those who spread 
information is under continuous pressure from the government.
For instance, in the beginning of July 2013, the chief editor of the journal Adam Reader’s, 
Gulzhan Yergalieva, stated that the latest issue of the Kazakhstani journal could not 
be published because she could not find any printer who would print it. One press 
claimed the rejection was due to technical problems, others said that they did not print 
publications of a political nature. According to the editor, Adam Reader’s contacted 
around 24 printers in Almaty and Almaty Province and was rejected everywhere. Many 
oppositional newspapers have met with the same practice.
Another example. The Consitution of Kazakhstan guarantees the right to vote and to 
be elected, as well as to participate in nationwide referenda. However, no election 
in Kazakhstan has ever been held in accordance with the principles of democratic 
elections. In the absence of alternative views, government-controlled media has been 
shaping public opinion to fit that of the government. In a sense, the public is being 
duped into the necessary result. It is impossible for opponents of the government to 
break through public opinion in the course of a one or two-month election campaign, 
especially considering that their chances of appearing on television is seriously limited. 
Secondly, people who to some extent are dependent on government officials (students, 
the military, doctors and employees of other state- funded institutions) are forced to vote 
for the preselected candidate. As a rule, a dependent person will not risk problems or 
enter into conflict, as it could cause him to get fired from his job. For this reason, he also 
keeps quiet about the pressure placed on him during elections, and does not take the 
matter to court. The situation is made even more difficult by the fact that Kazakhstani 
court system is cunning in its own right.
Kazakhstani judges are appointed (directly as well as indirectly through the Senate) by 
the President and do not enjoy political independence. Twenty years of practice has 
shown that the judges serve the political interest of the authorities. When a case is 
politically motivated (trials against political opponents, human rights activists, journalists, 
civil society activists), the courts rule in favor of the current political regime.
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FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
The Constitution of Kazakhstan guarantees the right of all citizens to hold peaceful 
meetings, rallies and demonstrations, street processions and pickets.1
However, the main Kazakhstani law regulating the exercise of the freedom of peaceful 
assembly2 stipulates that Kazakhstani citizens must first obtain permission from local 
authorities (Akimats). An assembly held without permission is considered to be a violation 
of the law, and its organizers are subject to administrative penalties. Only groups are 
allowed to apply to hold a meeting; there is no such right for individuals. 
Not only large-scale demonstrations are affected. Distributing leaflets, joining flash 
mobs, wearing T-shirts or carrying umbrellas with political signs or slogans, laying 
flowers at memorials is all considered to be “form[s] of expressing public, collective or 
personal interests and protest.” Any gathering where citizens discuss social or political 
issues requires permission from local authorities. 
The Law stipulates that assemblies may be held only if certain requirements are met. 
These include submitting a special application ten days before the date of an assembly 
and agreement to hold the assembly in a specially designated area. These areas are 
typically located far from the city center, where the event will not be noticeable to the 
general public or authorities. In Kazakhstan’s largest city, Almaty, this place is the park 
behind Sary-Arka cinema3. 
1 http://www.constcouncil.kz/eng/norpb/constrk/#section2, Article 32.
2 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 17 March 1995, “On the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Peaceful 
Assemblies, Meetings, Marches, Pickets and Demonstrations in the Republic of Kazakhstan”.
3 Areas designated for holding assemblies are established for almost every city and town in Kazakhstan. 
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In 2013 a local NGO4 reported that assemblies devoted to political themes had almost 
completely disappeared. During the second quarter of 2013, social protests rather than 
political ones dominated in the country. This is likely to have been caused by recent 
pressure on opposition groups.
The practice of restricting freedom of assembly in Kazakhstan is in violation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the OSCE Copenhagen Document 
and the OSCE ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly. 
The government of Kazakhstan should put an end to the de facto ban on peaceful 
assemblies, bringing practice in line with the rights established in the country’s 
Constitution and international standards.
4 Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law.  
http://www.bureau.kz/data.php?page=&n_id=6238&l=en
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Regardless of the fact that all processes give an impression of a fair trial from a formal 
point of view, it is impossible to speak of fair trials in Kazakhstan. The cunning lies in 
the fact that in every such case, the judge is an obedient executor of the political will 
of the government. As such, Kazakhstani courts have become a universal instrument 
of the “cunning democracy”.
Another example of the “cunning democracy” is the constitutional right to peaceful 
assembly. The guarantee of freedom of assembly is formally in accordance with the 
definitions found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
However, Kazakhstani authorities seriously curb the right of Kazakhstani citizens to 
meet peacefully and without weapons. 
The ICCPR permits limitations to the freedom of association, but only as separate 
exceptions from the general right to use this freedom, without any form of limitation. 
In Kazakhstan, the limitations on the right to peaceful assembly extend far beyond 
such exceptions and is instead a widely used practice. The mere fact that persons who 
wishes to hold an assembly can realize this right only after receiving permission from 
local authorities (the Akimat) is an impermissible limitation on the right to peaceful 
assembly. The absence of a permit automatically turns a peaceful assembly into an 
illegal one. In international practice, the legality or illegality of an assembly is decided 
primarily by its character – whether it is peaceful or not.
Another piece of cunning is the fact that in practically all large populated areas of 
Kazakhstan, the authorities have established special places where peaceful assemblies 
can be held. When considering an application to hold a demonstration, the Akimat will 
suggest that the event should be held in a spot specifically designed for this purpose. 
And, as a rule, these places are located far away from the center of the city. Events 
taking place here go unnoticed by society at large and by those whose attention they 
are supposed to attract. If those who have gathered refuse to hold their demonstration 
at the designated spot, the Akimat will reject their application to hold the event in a 
public place altogether. If the applicant does not agree with the Akimat’s rejection, 
considering this a violation of his rights, he may of course take the matter to court – that 
universal instrument of “cunning democracy” – which will only confirm the decision 
of the authorities.
Another right which has been cunningly stolen from the citizens by the current government 
is the right to establish political parties. The Constitution states that “Citizens of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan shall have the right to freely associate.” However, the realization 
of this right is lies in the hands of government officials, who have established legislation 
that makes registration of a political party highly difficult. In the case of oppositional 
parties, the law has become an insurmountable barrier. Not only does an opposition 
under administrative pressure have to find 40,000 members, they also have to observe 
complicated procedures for holding the meetings required to formally establish their 
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party. For every step, government officials will find innumerable reasons to withhold 
registration for unspecified periods of time. In order to reject an application for registration, 
it is sufficient to find a few persons who are willing to withdraw their signature, or 
who have died or left the country. This practice was used against the opposition party 
Alga!, whose party members wandered the offices of government officials for seven 
years, trying every conceivable way to get registered, but not succeeding in doing so. 
Such a practice in relation to the right to association looks more like an outright ban 
on political activity.
The above-mentioned are examples of Kazakhstani authorities’ intent to remove 
democratic content from the norms of the Constitution, to disavow them on the level 
of laws and regulations. For this reason, the Kazakhstani state, which externally is seen 
as democratic, is instead a Potemkin village raised to fool those who do not have the 
possibility to see the true situation with regards to human rights in Kazakhstan.
A perfect example of this is the realization of the National Action Plan on Human Rights 
for 2009-2012. On 5 May 2009, the president of Kazakhstan approved the National 
Human Rights Action Plan for 2009-2012, which contains a programme intended 
to guarantee human rights in Kazakhstan by bringing national legislation and legal 
practice into correspondence with international standards, including timeframes for 
the realization of these measures. It also specifies which departments are responsible 
for carrying them out. The recommendations of the National Action Plan concern the 
development of mechanisms for realizing the constitutional rights of citizens. Particular 
attention was paid to the strengthening of the court system, the development of non-
judicial mechanisms of protection of human rights and protection of civil and political 
rights on the level of international standards.
Up until Kazakhstan’s chairing in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), this document was considered one of the main indicators that the 
government of Kazakhstan was intent on keeping course on further democratization 
of the country. The plan was presented as a serious mechanism for the promotion of 
democratic principles in Kazakhstan, and received approval by the governments of 
a number of countries as well as international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.
During the four years of realization of the National Action Plan, only 23% of the 
recommendations included in its main chapters have been fulfilled, and only those 
which are of secondary importance to the fundamental human rights situation. The 
cunning is to be found in the fulfillment of only those recommendations which do not 
influence the actual situation. However, it gives the government the chance to speak 
about how much they are doing to promote democratic principles, pointing to a general 
“positive tendency” in the realization of the Action Plan. However, out of 14 points in 
the plan, each of which regards one concrete human right or freedom, the situation 
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF
The Constitution of Kazakhstan states that everyone shall have freedom of conscience 
and the right to determine his or her own religious affiliation.1 
In October 2011, a new Religion Law was adopted in Kazakhstan, which introduced 
harsh new punishments for unapproved religious activity. The new Law banned all 
unregistered religious activity, and required all registered communities to gain re-
registration within a year or face court-ordered liquidation.
Although the Religion Law made no mention of it, officials insisted that Muslim 
communities could only gain state registration if they joined the state-backed Muslim 
Board, a restriction which was not imposed on other faiths. The Muslim Board only 
recognizes Sunni mosques willing to subject themselves to its authority, which left 
independently-minded mosques and Shia mosques in a state of illegality.
Officials also insisted that mosques cannot cater to particular ethnic communities, 
a provision which equally was not applied to other faiths (such as Jewish, Russian 
Orthodox or Armenian Apostolic communities). 
The Law also bans sharing faith with others, unless an individual has been tasked to do 
this by a registered religious community and is personally registered to do so. Dozens of 
individuals have been fined for this in 2013, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Protestant 
Christians and Muslims. Persecution may also be initiated against non-believers, as 
was the case for Aleksandr Kharlamov, who initially was accused of “inciting religious 
1 Article 19 and 22 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan. http://www.constcouncil.kz/eng/norpb/constrk/
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hatred” for writing his atheist views. He has been held incommunicado and under 
enforced psychiatric investigation.
The 2011 legal changes also imposed a comprehensive system of prior compulsory 
censorship of all religious literature published, printed and sold in Kazakhstan, as well 
as imported into the country. 
In June 2013, fines were handed down even for inviting other people to religious 
meetings as courts agreed that this represented illegal sharing of faith. The presence of 
guests at a religious meeting was enough proof.
The government of Kazakhstan should revise its practice towards religious communities, 
bringing it in line with the country’s Constitution and international standards.
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with regards to 8 human rights (8 parts of the plan) has remained unchanged, whereas 
the situation with regards to 5 human rights (5 parts of the plan) has worsened.
According to monitoring carried out by human rights activists, improvement has only 
been observed with regards to the rights of the child, while a worsening situation has 
been noted with regards to respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. Certainly, an 
improvement of the rights of the child is a very important point. However, this cannot 
conceal the fact that the situation has worsened with regards to freedom of speech, 
including peaceful assembly, civil and political rights, the right to freedom of religion or 
belief and many others. This is a result of one of one the greatest cunnings of the past 
few years – the realization of the National Human Rights Action Plan for 2009-2012.
It is highly unfortunate that hypocrisy has become the main characteristic of Kazakhstani 
authorities’ attempts at “promoting democracy”. Moreover, under the pretext of bringing 
democratic institutes into line with the mentality and traditions of the population, these 
have been transformed into openly authoritarian instruments, through which attacks 
on human rights and freedoms are being carried out. In the name of the fight against 
extremism, the authorities crack down on peaceful strikers. While realizing the program 
“The road to Europe” opposition parties and media were closed down. Within the 
framework of the realization of the National Human Rights Action Plan, the authorities 
passes an openly repressive law on religious communities.
The current governments’ particular cunning lies in the fact that among its achievements 
it does not consider the welfare of the population, not the production potential of 
the country, not the level of public health or education, but rather membership and 
chairmanship in various international organizations, the hosting of international forums 
and award ceremonies.
This can hardly be called an achievement.
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